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Abstract—The problem of detecting replay attack to the linear
stochastic system with Kalman filer state estimator and LQG
controller is addressed. To this end, a dynamic attack detector
method is proposed which is coupled with the dynamics of the
system. While preserving stability of the main system, conditions
on parameters of the attack detector dynamics are obtained
such that the attack can be revealed by destabilization of a
residual trajectory which is the difference between the estimated
and measured output of the system. Using this method, system
operator can adjust the detection rate based on the proposed
scheme by changing the design parameters. Nevertheless, since
the exogenous attack detector signal affects the performance
of the closed loop control system, we propose an optimization
problem to determine such a detector with minimum loss effect.
In the simulation results, the proposed dynamical attack detector
approach is compared with the well-known additive white noise
watermarking method and the results confirm the superiority of
the new scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems refer to a new generation of sys-
tems which integrates computational, networking and physical
processes. Security of Cyber-Physical systems from control
theory point of view has gained lots of attention during the last
few years [1]. Due to widespread use of computer network in
control of physical systems, the malicious entities have seized
an opportunity to inject attacks on cyber-physical systems [2-
3].
The analysis over vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems
has attracted a tremendous amount of attention in past few
years. For instance, false data injection attack against static
state estimation in a power grid has been studied in [4].
The authors showed that if the injected signal to the sensory
measurements of the system lays within the range space
of the observation matrix, then the attack remains stealthy.
Conditions on the existence of undetectable and unidentifiable
attacks has been characterized in [5] using graph theoretic
method. It is assumed that the adversary is capable of injecting
the attack signal into the input and output of the system. In [6],
the cyber-physical attack is modeled based on adversary re-
sources including disruption, disclosure and information of the
system. Covert misappropriation attack against a networked
control system has been considered in [7]. In this type of
attack, attacker needs the complete information of the system
and more resources compared to other types of attack. Other
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standard types of attacks like Denial of Service (DoS) and
deception attacks have been considered in [8-10].
The problem of resilient state estimation in a standard
form has been addressed in [11-14]. They all assume that the
attacker injects attack vector to less than half of sensors, since
it has been shown that it is impossible to reconstruct the state
of the system whenever more than half of the sensors are under
attack. Reconstructing the state of a nonlinear control system
subject to sensor and actuator attacks has also been studied
in [15]. However, it is assumed that some set of sensors are
trustworthy. But, in the problem of replay attack detection
addressed in this paper, we assume that all sensors can be
compromised. It should be noted that our goal is only to detect
the presence of attack rather than estimating the true state of
the system during the attack time.
Replay attack against a centralized control system has been
introduced in [16] and [17] where for discrete time linear time
invariant (LTI) control systems an optimal noisy watermarking
signal (independent and identically distributed noise with zero
mean and specific constant covariance) has been proposed in
order to detect the attack. In a recent article of the same authors
[18], a stationary process is utilized such that the defender has
more degree of freedom to design the watermarking signal for
a discrete time control system, which improves the detection
rate with the same performance loss. The similar iid approach
has been proposed in [19] while the dynamic of the system is
unknown to the defender.
Detection of replay attack in frequency domain has been
introduced in [20]. It is claimed that the attack can be detected
without injecting watermarking signal. However, a restricting
assumption is made so that a white Gaussian noise signal with
enough power should exist into the communication network
system to detect the replay attack. Moreover, it has been
shown in [21] that by including a nonlinear term in the
control system in non-regular time intervals, the attack can be
detected. But, the performance loss induced by incorporating
such a nonlinear term into the system is not analyzed. The
problem of replay attack against multi agent systems has been
studied in [22] and a method based on sharing white Gaussian
watermarking signal between agents has been proposed. The
authors also initiated the idea of dynamic attack detector signal
for the replay attack to the linear continuous time systems in
[23].
In this paper, we introduce a new method based on injection
of dynamical attack detector signal to detect the replay attack
against discrete time LTI stochastic systems. In the replay
attack, it is assumed that there exists an adversary who is
capable of recording the sensory measurements for a period of
time, injecting a disruptive signal into the system and altering
the real sensory measurements of the system with the recorded
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measurements. It is also assumed that the defender has the
full information of the dynamic of the system. We provide
the conditions on the design parameters of the attack detector
signal so that the replay attack is detected while the system
remains stable in the absent of attack. Our approach yields
the following advantages and contributions with respect to the
literature
1) The proposed method in [16] and [17] are based on
injection of the white and colored noise to the system,
respectively that render a constant probability of attack
detection. But in our method, the attack detector signal
is generated based on a dynamic that uses output esti-
mation error. The probability of attack detection in our
method raises as the time increases and the attack can
be detected in a shorter period of time.
2) We provide the condition under which the attack can
be revealed using the proposed attack detector signal
(Theorem 1). It is also proved that by applying the
proposed attack detector signal, it is always possible for
physical systems to meet such condition (Theorem 2,
proposition 3 and Remark 7).
3) The detection rate of replay attack can be adjusted by
design parameters in our method and an optimization
problem is proposed so that the performance loss of the
system after injection of the attack detector signal is
minimized subject to detection rate constraint.
4) The performance of the proposed method is assessed
from two aspects
• It has been shown in simulation results that our
proposed method is more useful when defender
wants to detect the attack with greater level of
accuracy, since within a finite time, our method
can render more number of alarms in an arbitrary
window time.
• Since we do not inject the noise directly to the
system, the control signal in our proposed attack
detector has smaller range and lower energy with
respect to the control signal in white Gaussian noise
method for the same detection time and the same
desired number of alarms.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
Consider a control system, described by the following time
invariant linear system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + w(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t)
(1)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp are the state, input and
output vectors, respectively. Moreover, w ∈ Rn and v ∈ Rp
are the process and measurement noises which are assumed
to be independent white Gaussian processes with covariance
matrices Q and R, respectively. Initial condition x(0) is a
Gaussian random variable with mean µ and covariance Σ(0)
(i.e. x(0) ∼ N (µ, Σ(0))) is independent from process and
measurement noises.
B. Controller Structure
We assume that the pair (A,B) is controllable and (A,C)
is observable. Therefore, one can design a LQG controller that
minimizes the following cost
J = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{
xT (t)Wx(t) + uT (t)Uu(t)
}
(2)
where W and U are semi positive definite and positive definite
weight matrices with suitable dimensions, respectively. For
this system, state estimation unit based on the steady state
Kalman filter is in the following form
xˆ(t) = xˆ(t|t− 1) + L(y(t)− Cxˆ(t|t− 1))
xˆ(t+ 1|t) = Axˆ(t) +Bu(t) (3)
In which L = ΣeCT (CΣeCT +R)−1 and Σe is stabilizing
solution of the following Riccati equation
Σe = AΣeA
T −AΣeCT (CΣeCT +R)−1CΣeAT +Q (4)
and the control input to the system is the LQR gain multiplied
by the estimated state of the system as follows
u(t) = Kxˆ(t) (5)
where K = −(BTPB + U)−1BTPA and P is obtained from
the following Riccati equation
P = ATPA+W −ATPB(BTPB + U)−1BTPA (6)
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Attack Model
We consider there exists an adversary that disrupts the
control system (1) using replay attack. A replay attack model
is defined in [16], where the attacker targets sensory mea-
surements of the system and meanwhile injects a destructive
signal into the system. The attack procedure is performed in
two phases
1) During the first phase, from time −τ to −1, attacker
records the sensory measurements.
2) In the second phase, from time zero to τ − 1, attacker
replaces the sensory measurements of the system with
the recorded ones, as follows
y(t) = y(t− τ) for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1
In addition, during the second phase of the attack, the
attacker injects a disruptive signal f(t) through the
external input channel Ba to the system as follows
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Baf(t)
y(t) = y(t− τ) = yτ (t) (7)
The signal f(t) is chosen by the attacker and this informa-
tion is not commonly available to the defender. It is worth
mentioning that attacker does not need to know about the
model of the system. Having access to disclosure resources
in output channel and disruption resources in input and output
channels is sufficient to perform the replay attack.
We define r(t) = y(t)− Cxˆ(t|t− 1) as the residue signal of
the system. When the system works on normal condition, the
residue signal is an innovation sequence with zero mean and
covariance H = CΣeCT + R [24]. Let define the following
weighted norm of the residual signal
g(t) = rT (t)H−1r(t) (8)
which has the Chi-square distribution form. It should be
considered that the defender utilizes g(t) to detect the presence
of abnormality in the system, by comparing g(t) with a scalar
η as a threshold which is determined by defender. Anomaly
detector will warn the system via an alarm if g(t) > η,
while the system is considered in its normal operation if
g(t) < η. When the system is in its normal condition, we
define α = P (g(t) > η) as the false alarm rate [25]. To
reduce the number of false alarm rates in a period of time,
usually η is adjusted in a way that α becomes close to zero.
It is also assumed that there exists a window time T that
defender counts the number of alarms in the interval (t−T, t)
at each time step t. If the number of alarms in a window
time exceeds a threshold (denoted by β) which is determined
by the defender, it is considered that the attack is occurred at
time t. Since the expected number of false alarms in a window
time is equal to αT, in order to avoid false attack detection in
normal condition of the system, the desired number of alarms
in a window time should be chosen enough larger than αT
(i.e. αT  β). Moreover, we define the detection time as the
required time to reach into the desired number of alarms β.
Notation: In rest of the paper the superscript τ shows the
delayed signal. For instance
xτ (t) = x(t− τ),
and superscript a shows the under attack system’s signals.
Therefore, from (7) we get ya(t) = yτ (t).
Remark 1. The amount of τ is determined by the attacker, and
as much as it becomes larger, the attacker will get enough time
to disrupt the system and also the defender will have enough
time to detect the attack. However, in the case that τ is too
small, we may not be able to detect the attack for a given β.
In fact, the attack is detected if the detection time be lower
than τ for a given β.
The system from −τ to zero can be described in the
following form
xτ (t+ 1) = Axτ (t) +Buτ (t) + wτ (t)
yτ (t) = Cxτ (t) + υτ (t)
(9)
where uτ (t) = Kxˆτ (t) and the state estimator of the system
in the absence of attack is as follow
xˆτ (t+ 1|t) = Axˆτ (t) +Buτ (t) (10)
xˆτ (t) = xˆτ (t|t− 1) + L[yτ (t)− Cxˆτ (t|t− 1)] (11)
When the system is under attack, the state equation and its
estimation are as follow
xa(t+ 1) = Axa(t) + Bua(t) +Baf(t) + wa(t) (12)
xˆa(t+ 1|t) = Axˆa(t) +Bua(t) (13)
xˆa(t) = xˆa(t|t− 1) + L[ya(t)− Cxˆa(t|t− 1)] (14)
By subtracting (10) from (13), we get
xˆa(t+ 1|t)− xˆτ (t+ 1|t) = A(xˆa(t)− xˆτ (t))+
+B(ua(t)− uτ (t)) = (A+BK)(I − LC)(xˆa(t|t− 1)
−xˆτ (t|t− 1)) + (A+BK)L(ya(t)− yτ (t))
(15)
Since ya(t) = yτ (t), (15) can be written as
xˆa(t+ 1|t)− xˆτ (t+ 1|t) = (A+BK)(I − LC)
(xˆa(t|t− 1)− xˆτ (t|t− 1)) (16)
Let define Γ ∆= (A+BK)(I − LC). We know that A+BK
and A(I − LC) are Schur individually, but the stability of
(A+BK)(I −LC) cannot be guaranteed. The residue signal
of the system under attack can be obtained as
ra(t) = ya(t)− Cxˆa(t|t− 1)
= yτ (t)− C(xˆτ (t|t− 1) + Γt (xˆa(0| − 1)− xˆτ (0| − 1)) )
= rτ (t)− CΓt (xˆa(0| − 1)− xˆτ (0| − 1))
(17)
If Γ is Schur, then the second term in (17) will vanish for
large enough t, leading to converges of ra(t) to rτ (t). Thus,
we get
lim
t→∞P (g
a(t) > η) = lim
t→∞P (r
aT (t)H−1ra(t) > η)
= lim
t→∞P (r
τ T (t)H−1rτ (t) > η) = α
(18)
According to (18), in the case the matrix Γ is stable, the
available transient time for convergence of ra(t) to rτ (t) is not
reliable for detection of the attack. Thus, the number of alarms
occurred in a window time during the attack can converge
quickly to the number of alarms in the normal condition of the
system. As a result, it is probable that attack remains stealthy
in the transient time and this motivates the need for designing
an attack detector method, when Γ is stable. However, if Γ is
unstable, then both xˆa and ra(t) diverge to infinity and it is
straightforward to show that the attack will get detected.
Note that from (12) to (22), both the state estimation and
anomaly detector units use counterfeit output measurement
and not the real output of the system. Consequently, f(t) has
no effect on the state estimation and anomaly detector units.
IV. ATTACK DETECTOR SIGNAL DYNAMICS
In the previous section, we studied that in the case matrix
Γ is stable, the replay attack remains undetected. Here, we
propose a method for detection of the replay attack which
causes the residue signal to become unstable. Using this
method in a finite time, the most achievable number of alarms
with arbitrary size can be obtained for a given window time T.
Moreover, the detection rate can be controlled by the defender
and the design parameters can be adjusted to minimize the
performance loss caused by including the attack detector
signal.
Let us assume that using the accessible information of model
and input-output data of the system, defender generates attack
detector signal ξ according to the following process
ζ(t+ 1) =A˜ζ(t) + M˜(y(t)− Cxˆ(t)) (19)
ξ(t) =K˜ζ(t)
where the matrices A˜ ∈ Rn×n, M˜ ∈ Rn×p and K˜ ∈ Rm×n are
determined by the defender as design parameters. Fig. 1 shows
a schematic of under attack control system with the proposed
attack detector generation unit. Moreover, we assume that the
defender uses the following input signal that is composed of
control signal and generated attack detector signal
u(t) = Kxˆ(t) + ξ(t) (20)
After injecting the attack detector signal into the system, the
first requirement is that the stability of the free of attack system
is guaranteed.
Remark 2. We assume that the system uses standard LQG
controller to regulate the origin in an optimal manner. There-
fore, the gain of control signal and observer parameters
cannot be changed for the sake of attack detection.
Remark 3. The attacker can cancel out the effect of attack
detector signal if he or she knows the exact model of the actual
system and the structure of attack detector dynamic. Moreover,
it should have access to input-output measurement, and the
estimated state of the system to construct the negative of this
signal. However, clearly having access to such information
is not straightforward for the attacker. Moreover, we assume
that the controller unit is secure and the attacker is not able
to make the attack detector signal zero.
Figure 1. A schematic of under attack control system with a dynamical
attack detector signal generation unit. Attacker replays the previous
output measurements into the system. Output of the system and
estimated state are used for generating attack detector signal.
Proposition 1. The stability of the system (1) after applying
the control input (20) can be guaranteed, if and only if the
matrix A˜ is Schur.
Proof. The stability of the system can be verified by aug-
menting the dynamic of the system, estimator error and attack
detector signal as follows
x˜(t+ 1) = Θ x˜(t) + Φ (t) (21)
where e(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) and
x˜(t)
∆
=
 x(t)ζ(t)
e(t)
 ,
Θ
∆
=
 A+BK BK˜ −BK0 A˜ M˜C
0 0 (I − LC)A
 ,
Φ(t)
∆
=
 w(t)M˜υ(t)
(I − LC)w(t)− Lυ(t+ 1)

Since the matrix Θ is upper triangular, A+ BK and (I −
LC)A are Schur therefore, the matrix Θ is Schur if and only
if the matrix A˜ is Schur.
Proposition 2. Injection of the attack detector signal has no
effect on the residue signal of the system.
Proof. We have assumed the control signal as u(t) = Kxˆ(t)+
ξ(t). Now, let’s define e¯(t) ∆= x(t)− xˆ(t|t− 1). Then
e¯(t+ 1) = x(t+ 1)− xˆ(t+ 1|t)
= Ax(t) +Bu(t) + w(t)−Axˆ(t)−Bu(t)
= A(x− xˆ(t)) + w(t)
= A (x(t)− (I − LC) xˆ(t|t− 1)− Ly(t)) + w(t)
= A (I − LC) e¯(t) +ALv(t) + w(t) (22)
and also we have
r(t) = y(t)− Cxˆ(t|t− 1) =
= C (x(t)− xˆ(t|t− 1)) + v(t) = Ce¯(t) + v(t) (23)
Since A(I − LC) is Schur, the expectation of r(t) will
be equal to zero in steady state and also its covariance will
be bounded. It can be seen that the attack detector signal in
control input has no effect on the residue signal in the absence
of attack because u(t) is a known signal and it disappears in
the subtraction of xˆ(t+ 1) from x(t+ 1)
A. Detection of replay attack using the proposed attack detec-
tor method
In this section, we want to analyze the problem of attack
detection using the proposed dynamic attack detector. State
estimation dynamic of the under attack system after injection
of the attack detector signal is obtained as follows
xˆa(t+ 1|t) =Axˆa(t) + B(Kxˆa(t) + ξa(t)) (24)
=(A+BK) [(I − LC)xˆa(t|t− 1) + Lya(t)]
+BK˜ζa(t)
Moreover, the state estimation of the attack-free system is
given by
xˆτ (t+ 1|t) =Axˆτ (t) + B(Kxˆτ (t) + ξτ (t)) (25)
=(A+BK) [(I − LC)xˆτ (t|t− 1) + Lyτ (t)]
+BK˜ζτ (t)
Rewriting (19) for both under attack and attack free conditions,
the difference of the new equations is as follows
ζa(t+ 1)− ζτ (t+ 1) = A˜(ζa(t)− ζτ (t))
−M˜C(I − LC) [xˆa(t|t− 1)− xˆτ (t|t− 1))] (26)
Also subtracting (25) from (24) we get
xˆa(t+ 1|t)− xˆτ (t+ 1|t) = Γ(xˆa(t|t− 1)− xˆτ (t|t− 1))
+BK˜(ζa(t)− ζτ (t))
(27)
where we used the fact that ya(t) = yτ (t). By defining
σ(t) =
[
σ1(t)
σ2(t)
]
∆
=
[
xˆa(t|t− 1)− xˆτ (t|t− 1)
ζa(t)− ζτ (t)
]
(28)
(26) and (27) can be represented as the following state space
model
σ(t+ 1) =
[
Γ BK˜
−M˜C(I − LC) A˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
σ(t) (29)
in which ∆ stands for the attack detection matrix. In what
follows, we study the condition that replay attack using the
proposed attack detector signal can be detected.
Theorem 1. If the matrix ∆ has an eigenvalue with modulus
greater than one, then the attack will be detected.
Proof. the residue signal of the under attack system is
ra(t) =ya(t)− Cxˆa(t |t− 1) = yτ (t)
− C(σ1(t) + xˆτ (t |t− 1)) = rτ (t)− Cσ1(t)
(30)
Rewriting (8) for under attack condition we get
ga(t) =raT (t)H−1ra(t) = (rτ (t)− Cσ1(t))TH−1
× (rτ (t)− Cσ1(t)) = rτ T (t)H−1rτ (t)
− σT1 (t)CTH−1rτ (t)− rτ T (t)H−1Cσ1(t)
+ σT1 (t)C
TH−1Cσ1(t)
(31)
It is straightforward to show that for unstable σ1(t) we have
lim
t→∞P (g
a(t) > η) = 1 and therefore, the attack will be
detected. Now we show that if the matrix ∆ has at least one
eigenvalue outside the unit circle, then σ1(t) will be unstable.
Assuming the matrix ∆ has n distinct eigenvalues, the solution
of the system (29) can be obtained as
σ(t) = c1λ
t
1p1 + ...+ cnλ
t
npn (32)
where pi is the i-th right eigenvector of ∆ and ci is a constant
equal to the inner product of the i-th left eigenvector and initial
condition σ(0). Assume that λi is an eigenvalue outside the
unit circle. It is clear that if at least one of the upper n rows
of the vector pi is nonzero, then σ1(t) will be unstable (note
that since σ(0) is taken from a stochastic distribution, ci is
almost surely a nonzero constant). Now, assume for the sake
of contradiction the case that the n upper rows of the vector
pi are zero. According to eigenvalue definition for λi we have
[
Γ BK˜
−M˜C(I − LC) A˜
] [
0
pi,2
]
= λi
[
0
pi,2
]
(33)
where pi,2 represents the lower n rows of the vector pi. From
the above equation we have
A˜pi,2 = λipi,2 (34)
From (34), it can be observed that λi and pi,2 are the
eigenvalue and eigenvector associated with the matrix A˜, re-
spectively. But it contradicts to the fact that all the eigenvalues
of A˜ are inside the unit circle. Therefore, we can conclude that
the upper n rows of eigenvector pi associated with the unstable
eigenvalue cannot be all equal to zero.
In [17], the detectability of attack has been verified when the
matrix Γ = (A+BK)(I−LC) is unstable. In our method, by
adding the attack detector dynamic as expanding the dynamics
of the underlying system, the matrix Γ is extended to matrix
∆. In addition to increasing probability of attack detection in
the proposed dynamic attack detection method, the extended
matrix ∆ contains some designed parameters which can be
used to optimize the performance of detection method.
Remark 4. Even if we have an eigenvalue with some mul-
tiplicity, there exists at least one independent eigenvector
associated with that eigenvalue. Therefore, the discussion on
the independent eigenvectors which is presented in proof of
Theorem 1 can be applied since, we do not need to use the
other generalized eigenvectors for this purpose and the proof
remains unchanged.
Remark 5. In theorem 1, from lim
t→∞P (g(t) > η) = 1, it can
be deduced that in infinite time the anomaly detector gives the
most achievable number of alarms βmax (continues alarm)
in a given window time, nevertheless, it is sufficient that the
number of alarms exceeds a threshold to detect the attack.
Thus, if this threshold is less than βmax, the attack can be
revealed in a finite time.
In the following theorem we show that according to the
degrees of freedom on choosing the matrices M˜, K˜ and A˜,
the defender can make the matrix ∆ unstable.
Theorem 2. If the matrix Γ is full rank, by adjusting the
matrices M˜, K˜ and stable A˜, the matrix ∆ will have at least
an eigenvalue with modulus greater than one.
Proof. We know that the product of all eigenvalues of a matrix
is equal to the determinant of that matrix. If det(∆) > 1, then
there exists at least one eigenvalue of ∆ that is outside of the
unit circle. In what follows, we prove that if the matrix Γ is
full rank, by adjusting the design matrices M˜, K˜ and A˜ one
can make the determinant of the matrix ∆ greater than one.
We know that if det(Γ) 6= 0, we have
det
([
Γ BK˜
−M˜C(I − LC) A˜
])
= det (Γ)
×det
(
A˜ + M˜C(I − LC)Γ−1BK˜
) (35)
Since Γ is Schur, the absolute of its determinant is lower than
one. Assume that the element (i, j) of M˜ and the element
(r, s) of K˜ get two arbitrary values m and k, respectively, and
the other elements of M˜ and K˜ are set to zero. It is obvious
that only i-th row of M˜C(I − LC) and s-th column of BK˜
remain nonzero. Therefore, the matrix M˜C(I − LC)Γ−1BK˜
will have only one nonzero element in its (i, s) entry, that can
be chosen in a desired way. The determinant of A˜ along the
i-th row appears as a linear combination of the determinants
of the minors Mij , which cannot be all equal to zero if A˜ is
chosen an invertible matrix. Let ais be the nonzero element
associated with such a nonzero determinant, therefore we have
det(A˜ + M˜C(I − LC)Γ−1BK˜) = µ1 (36)
+µ2mk det(Mis)
where µ1 and µ2 are constants. Then, one can choose m and
k in a way that det(∆) is greater than one.
Proposition 3. The matrix Γ is full rank if and only if the
matrix A is full rank.
Proof. We know that the multiplication of two full rank
matrices is a full rank matrix and vice versa. Therefore, the
matrix Γ is full rank if and only if (A+BK) and (I − LC)
are full rank. First we show the matrix (I − LC) is always
full rank. Also we know that the following equality holds for
any M ∈ Rp×k and N ∈ Rk×p
det(Ip×p −MN) = det(Ik×k −NM) (37)
Therefore, using the fact that L = ΣeCT (CΣeCT +R)−1,
det(In×n − LC) can be written as
det (In×n − LC) = det (Ip×p − CL) =
det
(
I − CΣeCT
(
CΣeC
T +R
)−1)
=
det
((
CΣeC
T +R− CΣeCT
) (
CΣeC
T +R
)−1)
=
det
(
R
(
CΣeC
T +R
)−1)
= det (R)
×det
((
CΣeC
T +R
)−1)
(38)
Since the matrix R is full rank and positive definite, and
also the matrix CΣeCT is a positive semi-definite matrix,
therefore, det(In×n − LC) > 0.
For the matrix A + BK, we can follow the same procedure.
det(A+BK) can be written in the following form
det(A+BK) = det
(
A−B(BTPB + U)−1BTPA)
= det(A) det
(
In×n −B
(
BTPB + U
)−1
BTP
)
= det(A) det
(
Im×m −BTPB
(
BTPB + U
)−1)
=
det(A) det
((
BTPB + U −BTPB
)(
BTPB + U
)−1)
= det(A) det
(
U
(
BTPB + U
)−1)
= det(A) det(U)×
det
((
BTPB + U
)−1)
(39)
Since the matrix U is positive definite and also
the BTPB is positive semi definite, therefore,
det(U) det
((
BTPB + U
)−1)
> 0. As a result, A + BK
is full rank if and only if the matrix A is full rank and the
proof is completed.
Remark 6. The cyber-physical systems which are under study
of this paper are continuous time in reality. It is straightfor-
ward to show that the matrix A which can be obtained after
discretization of any continuous time dynamic is full rank and
therefore, the condition in Proposition 3 is always satisfied.
Now, among all the feasible values for design matrices M˜,
K˜ and stable A˜, we seek for those with minimum performance
loss effect in the absence of attack. In what follows we obtain
the performance loss of the system after injection of the
proposed attack detector signal.
B. Performance Loss
Here, we follow the procedure for obtaining the perfor-
mance loss (new cost function) after injection of the attack
detector signal.
The input of the system after inserting attack detector signal
is as follows
u(t) = Kxˆ(t) + ξ(t) = Kxˆ(t) + K˜ζ(t) (40)
The performance loss is defined as
J˜ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{
xT (t)Wx(t) + uT (t)Uu(t)
}
(41)
Therefore, after injection of the attack detector signal to the
system, the performance loss can be written as
J˜ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{
xT (t)Wx(t) +
(
K
(
x(t)− e(t))
+ K˜ζ(t)
)T
U
(
K
(
x(t)− e(t))+ K˜ζ(t))} =
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{[
xT (t) ζT (t) eT (t)
]
=
W +KTUK KTUK˜ −KTUKK˜TUK K˜TUK˜ −K˜TUK
−KTUK −KTUK˜ KTUK

︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
x(t)ζ(t)
e(t)
}
(42)
J˜ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{
tr
(
x˜T (t)Gx˜(t)
)}
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
E
{
tr
(
x˜(t)x˜T (t)G
)}
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
t=1
tr (Gcov(x˜(t))) = tr (Gcov(x˜))
(43)
where according to (21), cov(x˜) can be obtained by solving
the following Lyapunov equation
cov(x˜) = Θcov(x˜)ΘT + E{ΦΦ T } (44)
By taking the expectation values of the elements of Φ TΦ we
get
cov(x˜) = Θcov(x˜)ΘT+ Q 0 Q(I − LC)T0 M˜RM˜T 0
(I − LC)Q 0 (I − LC)Q(I − LC)T + LRLT

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ψ
(45)
C. Optimization Problem
The optimal values for M˜, K˜ and A˜ can be found from the
following optimization problem
min
A˜, M˜, K˜
tr (Gcov(x˜))
st. cov(x˜) = Θcov(x˜)ΘT + Ψ
1 < δ ≤ max{abs(eig(∆))}
A˜ : Schur and full rank
(46)
Proposition 4. The optimization problem (46) is feasible.
Proof. Since the matrix Θ is Schur, according to Proposition 1
and also due to the fact that the matrix Ψ in the right hand side
of (45) is a non-negative definite matrix, there exists a unique
non-negative definite solution to the Lyapunov equation (45).
On the other hand, in Theorem 2, we showed that one can
adjust the absolute value of the maximum eigenvalue of the
matrix ∆ to become greater than any scalar δ > 1. Therefore,
the feasible domain of the optimization problem (46) is non-
empty.
It should be mentioned that the optimization problem (46) is
a non-convex nonlinear programming. Nevertheless, there are
many nonlinear programming methods for solving non-convex
problems such as interior point, trust-region-reflective, etc.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, DC motor systems that are commonly used
in cyber-physical systems are considered to verify the results
of the paper. By assuming that the magnetic field is constant,
the state space model of the system is LTI and can be
represented as follows
d
dt
 θθ˙
i
 =
 0 1 00 − bJ KtJ
0 −KbL −RL
 θθ˙
i
+
 00
1
L
V (t)
(47)
y(t) =
[
1 0 0
]  θθ˙
i
 (48)
The physical parameters for this example are given in
Table 1. It is assumed that the model (47) is discretized with
sampling time Ts = .01s. The cost matrices for this system,
W and U, and covariance matrices, Q and R, are equal to the
identity matrix with appropriate dimensions. The cost of LQG
controller is j∗ = 1.04 and we set the scalar γ in a way that
α = .01. We fix the window time T = 1s (equal to 100 sample
time). If the number of alarms occurred in this window time
exceed the desired number of alarms β, then the attack will
be revealed.
It is assumed that the attacker records output measurements
from time interval [−15 0]s and replays them exactly in time
interval [0 15]s. For this system, the matrix Γ has three
eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Consequently, the attack
will remain stealthy and the defender has to use another
countermeasure against the attack.
We have designed our proposed attack detector signal by
solving the optimization problem (46) for δ = 1.03. The
design matrices are as follows
A˜ =
 .48 −.81 .02.01 .61 −.92
.89 .73 −.9
 , M˜ =
 −.84−.49
−.81

K˜ =
[
.9 −.1 .35 ]
(49)
Since the system behaves stochastically, we use expected
detection time (the average time that is needed to reach a
desired number of alarms β) instead of detection time. In
Fig. 2, we have compared the expected detection time in our
proposed method with white Gaussian watermarking signal
method in the case that performance loss is equal for both
methods. Each individual curve is obtained by averaging on
1000 experiments.
In Fig. 2, it can be seen that our proposed method gives lower
expected detection time for all desired number of alarms.
However, for β ≥ 5 the White Gaussian is not capable
of detecting the presence of attack but the proposed attack
detector method can even reveal the attack for the most
achievable number of alarms βmax = 100.
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Figure 2. Expected detection time versus number of alarms for our
proposed method with δ = 1.03 and white Gaussian watermarking
signal for the same performance loss.
Table I
PHYSICAL PARAMETERS OF DC MOTOR
Parameter Value
b 3.5× 10−6 N.m.s
J 3.23× 10−6 kg.m2
L 2.75 ×10−6 H
Kb 0.0274 V/rad/sec
Kt 0.0274 N.m/Amp
R 4 Ohm
In Fig. 3 we compare the control signal of our proposed
method with control signal of white Gaussian watermarking
method in the case that they give the same detection time
(.5s) for the same desired number of alarms β = 30. As it
can be seen, the control signal in our proposed attack detector
is smoother, has smaller range and lower energy with respect
to the control signal in white Gaussian noise method.
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Figure 3. Control signal after injection of our proposed (blue line)
and watermarking signal (red line).
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Figure 4. The amount of performance loss versus δ. By increasing δ
the amount of performance loss will also increase.
Moreover, Fig. 4 examines the relation between the amount
of performance loss and maximum eigenvalue of detection
matrix ∆. It is clear that by increasing δ the amount of
performance loss increases as well.
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